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I. CHARLES WILKINSON AS PROPHET: THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
AND THE FEDERALIZATION OF WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT.
A. Section 9 and Water Rights.
1. United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District, 788 F. Supp. 1126
(E.D. Cal. 1992).
a. The entrainment of winter-run chinook salmon in irrigation diversion
pumps is a "taking" in violation of section 9.
b. The exercise of water rights is subject to the requirements of the
Endangered Species Act.
"Mlle District argues that state water law rights should prevail over the
Endangered Species Act. The Act provides that federal agencies should
cooperate with state and local authorities to resolve water resource
issues regarding the conservation of endangered species. 16 U.S.C. §
1531(c)(2). This provision does not require, however, that state water
rights should prevail over the restrictions set forth in the Act. Such an
interpretation would render the Act a nullity. The Act provides no
exemption from compliance to persons possessing state water rights, and
thus the District's state water rights do not provide it with a special
privilege to ignore the Endangered Species Act."
2. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (upheld in Sweet Home Communities for a Greater Oregon
v. Babbitt, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995)).
a. "Harm in the definition of 'take' in the Act means an act which actually
kills of injures wildlife Such an act may include significant habitat
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by
significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding,
feeding, or sheltering."
b. Water diversions and impoundments that significantly alter flows may
violate section 9.
c. Questions of foreseeability and proximate causation. See, e.g., Sweet
Home (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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"Proximate causation is not a concept susceptible of precise
definition. It is easy enough, of course, to identify the extremes. The
farmer whose fertilizer is lifted by tornado from tilled fields and
deposited miles away in a wildlife refuge cannot, by any stretch of the
term, be considered the proximate cause of death or injury to protected
species occasioned thereby. At the same time, the landowner who drains
a pond on his property, killing endangered fish in the process, would
likely satisfy any formulation of the principle. We have recently said
that proximate causation "normally eliminates the bizarre," and have
noted its "functionally equivalent" alternative characterizations in terms
of foreseeability, and duty. Proximate causation depends to a great
extent on considerations of the fairness of imposing liability for remote
consequences. The task of determining whether proximate causation
exists in the limitless fact patterns sure to arise is best left to lower
courts. But I note, at the least, that proximate cause principles inject a
foreseeability element into the statute, and hence, the regulation, that
would appear to alleviate some of the problems noted by the dissent.
See, e.g., [Scalia, J. dissenting] (describing "a farmer who tills his field
and causes erosion that makes silt run into a nearby river which depletes
oxygen and thereby [injures] protected fish").
"In my view, then, the "harm" regulation applies where
significant habitat modification, by impairing essential behaviors,
proximately (foreseeably) causes actual death or injury to identifiable
animals that are protected under the Endangered Species Act. Pursuant
to my interpretation, Palila 11 [852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988)]—under
which the Court of Appeals held that a state agency committed a
"taking" by permitting feral sheep to eat mamane-naio seedlings that,
when full-grown, might have fed and sheltered endangered palila—was
wrongly decided according to the regulation's own terms. Destruction
of the seedlings did not proximately cause actual death or injury to
identifiable birds; it merely prevented the regeneration of forest land not
currently inhabited by actual birds."
B. Section 7 and Federal Reclamation Contracts.
1. Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1316
(1996).
a. Biological opinion for the operation of the Klamath River project to
protect the lost river and shortnose suckers requires maintenance of
minimum reservoir levels, which diminishes water supply to project
contractors.
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b. Plaintiff ranchers and irrigation districts do not have standing to challenge
the biological opinion or the designation of critical habitat, because they
do not assert an interest in the protection of species and therefore fall
outside the zone of interests protected by the Endangered Species Act.
c. Does the zone of interests test apply to claims brought under the citizen
suit provisions of the federal environmental laws, such as section 11(g) of
the Endangered Species Act?
d. If so, are economic interests affected by a critical habitat designation or
the reoperation of a water supply project pursuant to the recommendations
of a biological opinion within the zone of interests protected by the
Endangered Species Act?
2. O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995).
a. Reduction in water service to users within San Luis Unit of the Central
Valley Project to protect winter-run chinook salmon and Delta smelt as
directed by the biological opinions for the operation of the Central Valley
Project does not violate the users' contract rights.
b. Federal reclamation contracts are subject to the "sovereign acts" doctrine
as articulated in prior cases such as Peterson v. Department of the Interior,
899 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1990), Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social
Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986), and Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
C. Groundwater and the Endangered Species Act.
1. Groundwater pumping that lowers the groundwater table below the level
required to support listed species of plants or critical vegetative habitat for
listed animal species may violate section 9.
2. Several listings in California identify groundwater pumping as a potential
threat to endangered or threatened species.
a. 60 Fed. Reg. 10694 (1995) (Southern Willow Flycatcher).
b. 59 Fed. Reg. 5494 (1994) (Tidewater Goby).
c. 59 Fed. Reg. 14378 (1994) (Parish's Alkali Grass).
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II. WATER RIGHTS AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT
A. Endangered Species Act § 2(b):
"The purposes of this Act are to provide a means whereby the ecosystems
upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be
conserved . .
B. Examples of the Endangered Species Act as a Unifying and Integrative Force in
Water Resources Management.
1. Columbia and Snake River System.
a. Pacific Northwest Generating Cooperative v. National Marine Fisheries
Service, 38 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 1994).
b. Northwest Resource Information Center v. Northwest Power Planning
Council, 35 F.3d 1371 (9th Cir. 1994).
c. Henry B. Lacey, New Hope for Salmon?, 2 West • Northwest 97 (1995).
d. John M. Volkman & Willis E McConnah, Through a Glass Darkly:
Columbia River Salmon, the Endangered Species Act, and Adaptive
Management, 23 Envtl. L. 1249 (1993).
2. Platte River System.
Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maintenance Trust v. FERC,
962 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
3. Sacramento-San Joaquin River System and Bay-Delta Estuary.
a. Principles for Agreement on Bay/Delta Standards Between the State of
California and the federal Government, 2 West • Northwest 97 (1995).
b. Environmental Protection Agency, Water Quality Standards for
Surface Waters of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers and San
Francisco Bay and Delta, Final Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 4664 (1995).
c. California State Water Resources Control Board, Water Quality
Control Plan for the San Francisco Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin
Delta Estuary, WR 95-1 (1995).
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III. "TAKINGS" AND TAKINGS: WATER RIGHTS, WATER CONTRACTS, AND
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT.
A. The Endangered Species Act and Federal Reclamation Contract Rights: O'Neill
v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995).
1. Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat.
4706, § 3406(b):
"The Secretary [of the Interior], immediately upon enactment of this title,
shall operate the Central valley Project to meet all obligations under state
and federal law, including but not limited to the federal Endangered
Species Act	 and all decisions of the California State Water Resources
Control Board establishing conditions on applicable licenses and permits
for the project. The Secretary, in consultation with other State and Federal
agencies, Indian tribes, and affected interests, is further authorized and
directed to:
* * *
(2) upon enactment of this title dedicate and manage 800,000 acre-
feet of Central Valley Project yield for the primary purpose of
implementing the fish, wildlife, and habitat restoration purposes
and measures authorized by [the Act]; to assist the State of
California in its efforts to protect the waters of the San Francisco
Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Estuary; and to help meet such
obligations as may be legally imposed upon the Central Valley
Project under state or federal law following the date of enactment
of this title, including but not limited to additional obligations
under the federal Endangered Species Act."
2. The Endangered Species Act:
"[The Bureau of] Reclamation's declaration of available supplies for water year
1993 is as follows:
CONTRACTORS	 PERCENT	 SUPPLY
Agricultural contractors north of the Delta	 100
Agricultural contractors south of the Delta 	 50
Urban contractors south of the Delta 	 100
Urban contractors south of the Delta 	 75*
Wildlife refuges north of the Delta 	 100
Wildlife refuges south of the Delta 	 75
Fish and Wildlife	 100
Sacramento River water rights holders	 100
and San Joaquin River exchange contractors
* Percentage of historic use.
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"The forecasted operations meet Endangered Species Act requirements and the
requirements of Public Law 102-575 (the Central Valley Project Improvement
Act). Two conditions influencing the availability of water for CVP contractors
are the cumulative effects of 6 previous years of dry conditions and the practical
and regulatory limits of moving water to CVP facilities south of the Delta under
the current conditions."
3. Westlands Contract:
Article 30: "The right to the beneficial use of water furnished to
the District pursuant to the terms of this contract and any renewal
hereof shall not be disturbed so long as the District shall fulfill all
of its obligations under this contract and any such renewal."
Article 11(a): "There may occur at times during any year a
shortage in the quantity of water available for furnishing to the
District through and by means of the Project, but in no event shall
any liability accrue against the United States or any of its officers,
agents, or employees for any damage, direct or indirect, arising
from a shortage on account of errors in operation, drought, or any
other causes. . . ."
Article 26: "In the event that the Congress of the United States
repeals the so-called excess-land provisions of the Federal
reclamation laws, Articles 23, 24, and 25 of this contract will no
longer be of any force or effect, and, in the event that Congress
amends the excess-land provisions or other provisions of the
Federal reclamation laws, the United States agrees, at the option
of the District, to negotiate amendments of appropriate articles of
this contract, all consistently with the provisions of such repeal or
amendment."
4. The Litigation.
a. Individual water users within the Westlands Water District claimed that
the United States breached the Westlands' water service contract in
violation of the Fifth Amendment by operating the Central Valley Project
to comply with the Central Valley Project Improvement Act and the
Endangered Species Act.
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b. The Ninth Circuit held:
"Article 11(a) of the water service contract provides that the government
shall not be held liable for "any damage, direct or indirect, arising from a
shortage on account of errors in operation, drought, or any other causes." The
government contends this language is broad and unambiguous and that shortages
stemming from mandatory compliance with ESA and CVPIA are shortages
resulting from "any other cause." Therefore, the government concludes, it is not
liable for its failure to deliver the full contractual amount of water to Area I.
Area I maintains that the contract language is ambiguous, and limits the
government's liability for water delivery only in the event of a "temporary
emergency" such as a "rare time[] of severe drought."
"* * * On its face, Article 11(a) unambiguously disclaims any liability
for damages in the event the United States is unable to supply water in times of
shortage. Clearly captioned "United States Not Liable for Water Shortage,"
Article 11 explicitly recognizes that "Where may occur at times during any year
a shortage in the quantity of water available for furnishing to the District" and
provides that "in no event shall any liability accrue against the United States ...
for any damages ... arising from a shortage on account of errors in operation,
drought, or any other causes." (emphasis added). As the district court duly
noted, there are no enumerated exceptions to this provision: "Westlands, as the
contracting party, did not include any language of limitation in the contract."
Barcellos and Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 849 F. Supp. 717, 723
(E.D. Ca1.1993).
"Area I claims that other provisions of the contract render the language
"shortage on account of ... any other causes" ambiguous. * * * Area I contends
that because Article 26 and the contract preamble explicitly reference statutes,
whereas the phrase "any other causes" does not explicitly include the effects of
subsequently enacted statutes, the scope of "any other causes" is ambiguous.
"[Ainy other causes" is a catchall phrase that does not "explicitly" include any
particular causes.
"Contrary to Area l's position, the specific reference to reclamation law
in Article 26 is not at all inconsistent with the notion that "any other causes"
broadly and unambiguously contemplates the effects of subsequent
Congressional mandates. Consistently with this court's prior interpretation of
identical language, in the event that reclamation law is amended, Article 26
gives the water districts "a choice between renegotiating their contracts to bring
them into conformity with the new law or withdrawing from the reclamation
program." Peterson v. Dept. of Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 812 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1003 (1990). Relieving the government from liability for
delivering Westlands' full contractual amount of water where a reduction is
mandated by statute, including by amendments to reclamation law, is not
incompatible with giving Westlands an option to renegotiate its contract to
conform to changes in reclamation law. Article 26 does not, therefore, render
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ambiguous the scope of "any other causes."
Even if the water service contract did obligate the government to supply,
without exception, 900,000 acre-feet of water, the district court correctly held
that Area I would still not be entitled to prevail as the contract is not immune
from subsequently enacted statutes. 849 F. Supp. at 730. The Supreme Court
has held that Congress's power to exercise sovereign authority "will remain
intact unless surrendered in unmistakable terms." Bowen v. Public Agencies
Opposed to Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52, 106 S. Ct. 2390, 2397, 91
L.Ed.2d 35 (1986) (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130,
148, 102 S. Ct. 894, 907, 71 L.Ed.2d 21 (1982)). "[C]ontractual arrangements,
including those to which a sovereign itself is party, 'remain subject to subsequent
legislation' by the sovereign." Id. (quoting Merrion, 455 U.S. at 147, 102 S. Ct.
at 907).
Nothing in the 1963 contract surrenders in "unmistakable terms"
Congress's sovereign power to enact legislation. Rather, the contract was
executed pursuant to the 1902 Reclamation Act and all acts amendatory or
supplementary thereto. 1963 Contract Preamble. See Madera Irr. Dist. v.
Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397, 1407 (9th Cir.) (Hall, J., concurring), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 59 (1993). The contract contemplates future changes in reclamation laws
in Article 26, and Article 11 limits the government's liability for shortages due to
any causes. As Area I recognized in its oral argument, CVPIA marks a shift in
reclamation law modifying the priority of water uses. There is nothing in the
contract that precludes such a shift.
5. Stockton East Water District v. Department of the Interior, No. CIV-F-
93-5896-0WW (E.D. Cal. filed Sept. 22, 1995).
a. Contract Shortage Provision:
"In its operation of the Project, the United States will use all
reasonable means to guard against a condition of shortage in the
quantity of water available to the Contractor pursuant to this
contract. Nevertheless, if a shortage does occur during any year on
account of drought, or other causes which, in the opinion of the
Contracting Officer are beyond the control of the United States, no
liability shall accrue against the United States or any of its officers,
agents, or employees for any damage, direct or indirect, arising
therefrom . ."
b. In Barcellos and Wollsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water District, 849
F. Supp. 717 (E.D. Ca1.1993), Judge Oliver Wanger denied the
United States' motion to dismiss breach of contract and Fifth
Amendment claims based on identical contract language.
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6. Winstar v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S.
Ct. 806 (1996).
B. The Endangered Species Act and Water Rights.
1. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992):
"Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives
land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist
compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the
nature of the owner" estate shows that the proscribed use interests
were not part of his title to begin with."
2. Reasonable Use, Beneficial Use, the Public Trust, and Other
Limitations that "Inhere in the Title."
a. Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights, and the
future of Water Law, 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 257 (1990).
b. Brian E. Gray, "In Search of Bigfoot": The Common Law
Origins of Article X Section 2 of the California Constitution,
17 Hastings Con. L.Q. 225 (1989).
c. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 Va. L. Rev.
1449 (1990).
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